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Metacognition is an awareness of how one thinks and learns. It 
includes an awareness of the strategies used to learn as well as an 
awareness of oneself as a learner. The purpose of this study was to 
describe children's metacognitive awareness during a classroo:n type 
task. A further purpose was to determine how grade level, achievement, 
and type of task influence this awareness. 
One hundred sixty-eight fourth, sixth, and eighth grade boys and 
girls were classified as high or low math achievers based on their 
performance on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, a group 
achievement test. These children were then rando~ly selected to receive 
either known or unknown math problems. The known math task was 
operationally defined as one that was easy; it was a problem that the 
children would be able to solve. The unknown task was operationally 
defined as one that was difficult, it was a math problem that these 
children would find unsolvable. l'llmediately following the task, the 
children were given feedback about their performance and were then asked 
to identify types of thoughts they may have had as they were working on 
the problems. The types of thoughts included general and specific 
strategies as well as ability and effort self-evaluations. 
A 3 x 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance design was used with 
Grade Level (four, six, and eight), Achievement (high and low), and Type 
of Task (known and unknown) as the between subjects factors. Findings 
showed that a known task elicited positive ability and effort 
self-evalu;itions for success. An unknown task evoked the use of more 
specific strategies than a known task. A grade level difference in 
metacognitive awareness showed that young children reported more 
metacognitive thoughts than older children. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent research on learning and instruction in both educational and 
psychological literature has focused on the study of how children 
actually learn in the classroom. One method utilized to examine learning 
is to find out what children are thinking as they do classr-oom tasks and 
how aware they are of these thoughts. 
Learning is defined as the process by which knowledge is acquired. 
Cognitive strategies are the procedures that facilitate this learning. 
Strategies help in the acquisition, retention, or retrieval of knowledge 
(Rigney, 1978). For example, in learning tasks that involve remembering, 
young children who use a rehearsal strategy do better than children who 
use no strategies (Keeney, Cannizzo & Flavell, 1967). Similarly, 
Carnine, Kameenui and Maggs (1982) taught young children a science rule 
about the food ladder. Other children were taught the rule as well as 
concepts associated with the rule. Neither instruction was as effective 
as specific strategy training which involved practice in determining how 
and when to apply the rule to specific examples. 
These studies suggest that when children are taught specific 
strategies, they become more effective learners. Are children aware of 
the strategies they use in the classroom? Are children aware of the 
strategies they are using only in a general way or in a specific manner? 
Are children aware of how they are performing during classroom tasks? 
\ 
Are children aware of the effort they put forth? Do they engage in 
evaluating their abilities? Does this awareness have self-evaluative 
change with age and with the type of material presented? 
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The purpose of the present study was to determine children's 
awareness of cognitive strategies and self-evaluations during classroom 
type tasks. The purpose was to discover the thoughts children are alert 
to or have knowledge of as they do classroom type tasks. A further 
purpose was to determine how grade level and achievement level influence 
these strategies and self-evaluations. 
The awareness children have of strategies or of themselves as 
learners is known as metacognition. Flavell (1976) described 
metacognition as an awareness, regulation, monitoring, and management of 
cognitive strategies in order to learn effectively. Metacognition 
involves both general and specific knowledge about learning. A child 
using metacognition has a general realization of when something is not 
understood and knows specifically whether re-reading the problem, asking 
for assistance, or some other strategy would be most helpful. A child 
using metacognition will also be more aware of whether a task is 
difficult or easy, and the child will know when information has been 
learned and when more practice is needed. 
Metacognition is believed to be developmental in nature (Brown, 
1978). The conscious awareness and control of what we know, what we 
need to know, and how to go about learning is said to increase with age. 
First-graders and college-age students, for example, have been found to 
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differ in their ability to estimate their performance on a memory recall 
task (Levin, Yussen, DeRose & Pressley, 1977). Worden and 
Sladewski-Awig (1982) also found that older children were better able to 
describe and give ideas about strategies and their use. Kindergarten 
children were unable to explain why they would remember certain items, 
but fourth and sixth graders were more aware of the importance of task 
variables in helping memorization. Myers and Paris (1978) reported an 
age-related difference in the metacognitive awareness of reading. In 
their study, sixth graders were more aware of how various strategies 
could affect learning than were second gra<lers. The sixth graders were 
able to give some indications about what makes one a good reader, were 
more aware of the structure of prose, and, were able to recount how 
different strategies could be effective depending on the type of reading 
being done. The effective learner not only must be aware of many 
strategies that can be used to learn, but must also know which ones to 
use in various situations. Brown and Smiley (1978) found that the 
ability to use extra study time to improve recall of a story was not 
present at all ages. Children below seventh grade did not benefit at 
all from extra study time; after seventh grade, a qualitative difference 
in strategy use was found. 
It appears that fourth graders have at least a basic awareness of 
metacognition (Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982); this awareness is even 
more developed by sixth graders (Myers & Paris, 1978), and the ability 
to use this awareness begins to be seen by eighth grade (Brown & Smiley, 
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1978). One aspect of the present study was to replicate these 
age-related changes in metacogni tion among fourth, sixth, and eighth 
grade children. In particular, fourth graders were expected to have the 
least awareness of metacognition, and the eighth graders to have the 
most awareness of metacognition. 
In addition to the age-related changes, Chi (1981) believes that 
the development of 1retacognitive strategies is related to the growth of 
content knowledge. Chi describes three types of knowledge. Procedural 
knowledge is a knowledge of rules such as knowing how to divide two 
digit numbers. Declarative knowledge is a knowledge of facts (e.g., In 
chess, the Queen can move in any direction). Procedural and declarative 
knowledge are together referred to as content knowledge. Strategic 
knowledge is a knowledge of rules that are applicable in several 
domains. An example of strategic knowledge would be knowing how to 
rehearse because it can he used w.i.th all subject areas and with many 
types of data. Other examples of strategic knowledge include 
identifying the main idea and checking or monitoring one's work. 
Strategic knowledge begins as domain specific procedural knowledge and 
eventually becomes more generalized. In Chi's view, content knowledge 
and strategic knowledge interact in a way that allows a child to learn 
to apply a strategy most easily when the content knowledge is stable and 
overlear.ned. 
Chi (1981) believes that when age differences are found in 
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1netacognitive stud.ies, the results may be attributed to the older 
children's greater knowledge. In one study, a chessboard with the 
figures arranged was shown to adults and children. The children in this 
study, had some knowledge of chess but the arlults had only limited 
knowledge. The children, presumably because of their greater knowledge, 
were able to memorize more about the placement of the pieces and did so 
in fewer trials. 
Chi and Koeske (1983) also demonstrated the influence of prior 
knowledge on learning with a young boy who was very interested in 
dinosaurs. Through various games and questions, forty dinosaurs were 
chosen and then divided into two groups. Twenty dinosaurs were well 
known to the boy, and the other twenty were less well known. In recall, 
clustering and retention tasks, the chili did better with the well known 
group of dinosaurs. The organization of knowledge for the better known 
dinosaurs was superior. There was a greater number of knowledge links, 
and the links were stronger. Knowledge of the well known dinosaurs was 
easily remembered by the child one year later. 
Glaser (1984) also suggests that problem-solving difficulty may be 
due to an inadequate knowledge base. He postulates that high aptitude 
individuals may appear to be better at reasoning because their level of 
content knowledge and procedural knowledge is greater. Specific prior 
knowledge was found to be a significant predictor of comprehension in a 
sixth grade reading task when both intelligence and reading achievement 
were controlled (Langer, 1984). Both the quality and quantity of prior 
knowledge was related to comprehension, but it was the qualitative 
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measure that was found to have the stronger relationship. 
Howe and Ceci (1979) have suggested that the ability to use 
effective strategies improves as a combined result of both development 
and increased content knowledge. Although fourth graders are aware of 
metacognitive skills, they do not use them effectively until eighth 
grade (Myers & Paris, 1978; Brown & Smiley, 1978). Within the present 
study, it was predicted that metacognitive awareness would increase with 
age, but it was also predicted that metacognitive awareness would be 
greater when the information presented was well known to the student. 
When the student is very familiar with the information, it should be 
easier to attend to the strategies one is using. 
In addition to age and familiarity with content, research also 
suggests that metacognitive skills may be more apparent in high 
achieving than low achieving students (Sanacore, 1984). Peterson and 
Swing (1982) have studied metacognitive strategy use during actual 
classroom instruction. The authors differentiated two types of 
strategies: general ones such as thinking, listening, or working and 
specific ones such as repeating, reviewing information, relating 
information to prior knowledge, checking an answer, and re-reading the 
prohlem to name a few. They found that high achieving students were 
able to name the specific strategies they used when learning whereas, 
low achieving students only identified general strategies. 
Hare and Smith ( 1982) reported on sixth and seventh graders who 
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were asked what they were thinking in order to remember the material 
they were reading. The only general strategy mentioned often was 
concentrating. Specific strategies such as imaging and re-reading were 
more commonly named. A moderately significant positive correlation was 
found between the number of strategies used and reading achievement. The 
students in this study were responding to open ended questions rather 
than a questionnaire or check list. 
Corno, Collins and Capper (1982) had teachers rate students on 
their academic orientation. The more academically oriented student was 
described as a student who took part and became involved in classroom 
learning. Students who were rated low on this scale reported using 
fewer strategies and reported having less cognitive control over their 
learning in classroom situations. They seemed unable to regulate their 
own thinking. 
In the present study it was predicted that students high in math 
achievement would be more aware of specific strategies than students low 
in math achievement. For example, high achieving math students are 
probably more aware of specific ways to try and solve math problems than 
low achieving math students. 
When learning is studied in a classroom situation, another 
dimension of metacognition emerges which involves self-knowledge of why 
one has succeeded or failed at a task (Weiner, 1979; Guthrie, 1983). 
The awareness that a person can affect learning by attitude, motivation, 
ability and other variables is present in some degree by kindergarten 
(Miller & Weiss, 1982). However, the accuracy of this awareness seems 
to increase with age (Nicholls, 1978). This self-knowledge is 
influenced in a classroom by other variables such as the task being 
performed and past performance. How one integrates classroom 
information and then uses this to understand why there has been success 
or failure has become known as attribution (Weiner, 1979). Attribution 
theory postulates that individuals strive to explain outcomes of 
achievement related events using factors such as ability, effort, task 
difficulty or luck (Weiner, 1979). 
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Weiner ( 1979) has suggested that ability and effort attributions 
are prevalent explanations for achievement outcomes and events and have 
contrasting consequences for subsequent achievement behaviors. For 
example, failure attributed to low ability will decrease the expectation 
of future success more than failure attributed to lack of effort. 
Diener and Dweck (1978, 1980) describe children who tend to attribute 
their failure in achievement situations to a lack of ability as learned 
helpless children. These children feel that they have no influence on a 
situation and no matter how hard they try, what they do will not really 
affect the outcome since they lack the basic ability to do well. By 
contrast, children who see failure as a lack of effort are referred to 
as mastery oriented children. They tend to focus on motivational 
factors and believe these factors influence outcome; thus they feel they 
can succeed if they really want to do well. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that achievement level affects 
the type of attributions consistent with an interpretation of learned 
helplessness (Rutkowsky & Willows, 1980). Poor readers attributed 
failure to ability whl le they often considered success due to some 
external factor other than their own ability or effort. Other studies, 
however, (e.g., Ames, 1984), have found that achievement differences may 
not affect attributional statements as much as the situation in which 
the chlld is tested. When children performed a task with other children 
present, they tended to focus on ability self-evaluations such as "Am I 
smart?" without regard to their achievement levels. When ch.lldren were 
tested individually they reacted more like mastery oriented children and 
focused on effort evaluations. 
Within the present study, it was predicted that the higher 
achieving students would make more self-evaluative statements especially 
when the task was a known one. It was also predicted that the unknown 
task would produce a focus on effort because the high achievers were 
expected to be more mastery oriented than the low achievers. 
Developmental factors may play a part in children's causal 
attributions for success and failure. Children as young as age three 
could use past performance information and make judgments about future 
performance based on this. This age group did not differentiate on the 
attributions which had caused the success or failure (Stipek & Hoffman, 
1980). A later study (Stipek ,'ii Tannat t, 1984), found that children 
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evaluated their abilities according to different rationales depending on 
the child's age. The preschool child was only able to say he was smart 
because he was smart, but as children reached grade three, they were 
able to explain their smartness by saying it was due to effort, work 
habits, or ability. There was, however, no clear distinction between 
these causes. This finding was also reported by Nicholls (1978). 
Effort, ability, and outcome are not differentiated as separate in young 
children. If a child tries hard he is smart even if he fails. Effort 
is seen as separate from outcome by age eight or nine, but the 
distinction between effort and ability is not fully understood until age 
twelve or thirteen. This implies that negative feedback on work habits 
could be interpreted as negative feedback on a young child's ability. 
Stipek and Tannatt (1984) found that as children got older, ratings 
of their own ability declined. By age eight, children rated themselves 
significantly lower in ability than preschoolers. This decrease in 
feelings of ableness was also found in a study by Rholes, Blackwell, 
Jordan and Walters (1980). Children at age five and six did not appear 
to be influenced by failure. Neither kindergarten children nor first 
graders showed significant correlations between their attributions and 
their behaviors. Significant correlations between these two factors 
were more prevalent in the third and fifth graders. For example, the 
fifth graders who rated themselves high in ability showed greater 
persistence and better performance on a task involving hidden pictures. 
The children who felt that the task was too difficult for them, showed 
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less persistence and had a poorer performance on the task. Rohrkemper 
and Bershon (1984) also found that older children were more likely to 
attribute the outcome of a task to their ability or effort than younger 
children. 
Predictions for the present study were that self-evaluative state-
ments such as "I am smart", and "I try hard" would increase with age as 
the children become more aware of the concepts of abili. ty and effort and 
their relationship to success and failure outcomes. 
Learning and self-evaluative statements about that learning cannot 
be considered separately. They interact to influence each other 
(Covington, 1979). Covington describes the ideal as using cognitive 
strategies to manage our ability while recognizing the amount of effort 
necessary to complete classroom tasks successfully. Thus in any given 
task, a student must be aware of useful cognitive strategies, and must 
know his/her ability, so that an accurate prediction of the effort 
needed for the task can also be made. The question is: do children 
consider all these aspects of metacognition when they are learning? 
While there is an increasing body of knowledge about metacognitive 
strategies and attribution, when they are considered together in the 
classroom, there is a significant gap in the literature. One of the few 
studies was done by Peterson, Swing, Braverman and Buss (1982). They 
asked students what they were thinking as they were learning a new math 
task and they found that the higher achieving students mentioned more 
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specific cognitive strategies. Self-evaluative or motivating statements 
(e.g., "I think I can do it" and "I tried my best"), however, correlate<l 
with the children's attitudes towards math, but not with their 
achievement. In this study, however, there were many more strategy 
questions than self-evaluative ones on the questionnaire given to 
students. In addition, in the stimulated-recall interview, most 
questions focused on strategies, and the wording of the questions gave 
little opportunity for self-evaluative statements. Thus the low number 
of self-evaluative statements may have been a function of the 
instruments used. 
Rohrkemper and Bershon (1984) also investigated what children think 
as they learn. They found that children faced with a difficult problem 
claimed to use strategic self-speech such as talking to themselves and 
repeating strategies to themselves. Self-evaluative statements were 
made less often and these involved more effort statements than state-
ments of ability. However, when faced with an easy problem, statements 
of self-evaluation were more frequent than strategy statements. A 
limiting factor in this study was the type of questioning utilized in 
the study. For example, several questions asked what the subject says 
to himself when the work is hard or easy. This seems to encourage a re-
sponse of some kind even if the subject doesn't remember saying anything 
to himself. It was also a retrospective study that dealt with 
situations that may or may not have occurred recently. 
In the present study, it was predicted that high achieving math 
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students woul<l make more strategy statements than low achievers. It was 
also expected that the strategy statements would be specific rather than 
general. It was also predicted that a known task would evoke more 
self-evaluative statements than an unknown task. 
For the most part, researchers studying both metacognition and 
attribution have not investigated these areas with children doing 
schoohmrk in a classroom setting. Therefore, the issue of how best to 
study this topic has not been resolved. The present study focused on 
children's thoughts immediately after a school type math task. This 
immediacy guarded against the inaccuracies of retrospective subject 
reports discussed by Taylor and Fiske (1981). The questionnaire format 
also avoids some of the problems of experimenter subject interaction as 
well as the problems connected with interpretations of thought processes 
from what children might verbalize. The children are only asked what 
they thought rather than how or why (Taylor & Fiske, 1981). The 
statements used to develop the questionnaire include general and 
specific cognitive strategies derived from questionnaires used in the 
work of Peterson and Swing (1982) and attributions to ability or effort 
derived from questionnaires used in the attributional work of Ames 
( 1984). Research also indicates that when students are performing a 
task the.ir thoughts are naturally focused on strategies needed to solve 
the task. After a task is finished, students react with 
attribution-type thoughts. To deal with this bias, Ames (1984) tapped 
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children's thoughts as they had completed two tasks and were anticipa-
ting a third. This methodology ~as also employed in the present study. 
In summary, the present research focused on children's awareness of 
metacognitive thoughts during school type tasks, This study examined 
the effects of age, ability, and information on children's awareness of 
strategies and self-evaluative statements, The operational definition 
of this awareness was whether or not the children recognized the ques-
tionnaire statments as being important. This awareness was measured by 
the number of statements checked. It was predicted that the older 
students would show more metacognitive awareness by choosing a greater 
number of statements both in the strategy and self-evaluative or 
attributional areas. The higher achieving children were expected to 
choose more statements than the lower achieving students, It was also 
predicted that the familiarity of a known task would elicit more 
strategy and self-evaluative statements than a more difficult unknown 
task. 
In a comparison of the two types of strategy statements, it was 
predicted that specific strategy statements would be chosen more than 
general strategy statements by the older high achievers, especially when 
the task was a known one. A comparison of ability and effort self-
evaluative statements was expected to elicit a greater number of ability 
statements for low achievers given an unknown task. It was predicted 
that high achievers given an unknown task would have a greater number of 
effort statements, 
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METHOD 
SUBJECTS 
The participants of the study were 168 children with 84 boys and 84 
girls. The children were selected from a total enrollment of about 360 
children in grades !+, 6 and 8 enrolled in two predominately white middle 
class parochial elementary schools in an urban section of Baltimore 
County. Familes from the one school were made up of mostly blue collar 
workers with some white collar workers and a few professionals among 
them. The other school had mostly white collar workers and 
professionals with only a few parents having blue collar jobs. 
Children in each grade who obtained parental permission were 
divided into those from the high or low half of their grade based on 
their total math achievement score on the Comprehensive Test of Basic 
Skills (CTBS) (McGraw-Hill, 1974). Children were then randomly dropped 
until there was an even number of high and low achievers of each sex at 
each grade level. These children were then randomly assigned to "known" 
and "unknown" test conditions controlling for grade level, class 
achievement and sex. The "known" task was operationally defined as a 
task consisting of easy math problerns while the "unknown" task was 
operationally defined as one made up of very difficult math problems. 
Of the 168 children in the study, there were 56 at each grade level. Of 
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the 56, 28 were high achievers and 28 were low achievers. Of each group 
of 28, 14 were assigned to the "known" task and 14 were assigned to the 
"unknown" task. 
PROCEDURES 
Five nnnths prior to the study, the entire 4th, 6th, and 8th grade 
classes were given two math tests, one easy and one hard. This provided 
normative data concerning the difficulty of specific math problems an1 
was the basis for determining easy versus hard math word problems at 
each grade level. At each grade level, four problems which all chlldren 
answered correctly were selected for the future easy word problems and 
four word problems that all children answered incorrectly were chosen 
for the hard math problems. 
After the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills was given in October 
of the school year, the children in each grade were grouped as to high 
or low math achievement by a median split. The median score for the l1th 
graders was a 4. 7 grade level. Scores ranged from a 2 .9 - 8. 5. The 
median score for grade 6 was 7.1. Scores at this grade ranged from 3.4 
to 11.9. The median grade level score for grade 8 was 9.5. The range 
of scores was from 5.6 to 12.9. After being grouped, the children were 
then randomly assigned so that there were the same number of boys and 
girls at each achievement level for each grade. 
On the day of testing, the children in each grade were taken in 
groups of approximately 10 to a separate room with one of two female 
examiners. The examiner explained to the group that they would be 
helping in a study to flnd out how children learn and that this would 
not count as part of their grade. 
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Each child was handed either an easy or difficult test with the 
four problems selected according to results on the pilot rest. Four 
problems were selected so that the students with the difficult test 
would not be frustrated to the point where they would stop working. The 
children were told to do the best that they could and they were told 
that they had five minutes. After five minutes, the answers were given, 
the children were told they did well or poorly, and then the tests were 
collected. The children were told that they would be given more 
problems in a minute, but first they were to answer some questions. 
While the children were anticipating a second task, they were asked to 
respond to a questionnaire ~1ich contained a checklist of twenty-five 
items. There was one general question about their thoughts followed by 
twelve self-evaluative statements, six on ability and six on effort. 
There were also six general and six specific cognitive strategy 
statements presented. All were presented in random order. The 
categories of statements are described below: 
1. General cognitive strategies. These statements referred 
to things one does when trying to take in information. 
They included such statements as "I thought about what I 
was doing," "I paid attention to what I was doing," "I 
2. 
kept my mind on my work," "1 concentrated on these 
problems," "I read the problems carefully," and "I 
thought about the problems." 
Specific cognitive strategies. These statements also 
referred to things one does when trying to take in new 
information but they were more detailed. This would 
include such statements a "I figured out little parts of 
the problem, then I did the work," "I thought about how 
the problems were like ones I did before," "I thought 
about the problems by using a blackboard in my head," "I 
first thought about what the answer should be, then I did 
the problem," "1 pictured the numbers in my head and then 
did the work in my head," and "I asked myself questions 
like 'Did I add the right numbers?'" 
3. Self-evaluative ability statements. These statements 
referred to one's ability to do the work. The statements 
given to the children with the "known" task included, "I 
am good at this kind of work," "I am good in math," "I 
knew what I was doing," "I can do this work," "I thought 
I was doing well," and "This was easy for me." For 
children with the "unknown" task, statements included, "I 
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am not good at this kind of work," "I am not good in 
math," "I didn't know what I was doing," "I can't do this 
kind of work," "I didn't think I was doing well," and 
"This was hard for me." The statements given to the 
"known" and "unknown" group were parallel but were 
related to their performance on the task. 
4. Self-evaluative effort statements. These statements 
referred to how much one tried in the situation. The 
statement given to the children with the "known" task 
included "I try hard on things like this," and "The 
harder the problems got, the harder I worked," "I worked 
hard on this," "I tried my best to get these right," "I 
am a hard worker," and "I tried my best." The statements 
for the "unknown" task group included, "I usually don't 
try hard on things like this," '~he harder the problems 
got, the less I tried," "I didn't work hard enough," "I 
di<ln' t try hard enough to get these right," "I didn't 
work hard enough," and "I didn't try to do well." The 
statements given to the "known" and "unknown" group were 
parallel but were related to their performance on the 
task. 
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The state1nents in each of the four categories were derived from the 
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instruments used by Ames (1984) and Peterson and Swing (1982). When 
independently classified by three expert judges an average .94 agreement 
was achieved across each of the four categories. 
The children were given the following instructions: 
There are some things students think to themselves when they 
are doing classwork like the problems you just did. Some 
children think a lot of things, other children don't think any 
of these things. Read the statements on this paper and check 
the statements that tell what you were thinking as you did the 
test. 
When the children were finished they were told that there was no 
more testing. They were thanked for their help and returned to their 
classroom. 
There were four scores obtained for each student, one on each of 
· the four scales, general, specific, ability and effort. Each category 
had a potential seven point range from O to 6 according to the number of 
statements a child checked in each category. 
ANALYSES 
To examine the data on self-evaluative and cognitive strategy 
awareness, ratings on measures of the known an<l unknown math problems 
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were analyzed using a factorial analysis of variance design with three 
crossed factors (Grade Level and Type of Task). The third effect 
(Achievement) was nested within Grade Level. The factors included three 
grade levels, 4th, 6th, and 8th, two levels of math achievement, above 
and below the median, and two levels of content, known and unknown. 
Several main effects were the focus of the study. It was expected 
that a main effect of grade level on strategy and self-evaluative 
statements would be found with older children choosing more 
metacognitive statements than younger children in each of the four 
areas. A main ef feet of achievement on the dependent variable was also 
expected with the higher achieving children choosing more strategy and 
self-evaluative statements. A main effect of the type of task on the 
dependent variable was examined. It was expected that a main effect of 
the type of task would be evidenced hy the known task eliciting more 
strategy and self-evaluative statements than the unknown task. 
This study also examined the interaction of grade level and type of 
task on strategy and self-evaluative statements. Because of their 
greater amount of content or prior knowledge, it was expected that an 
interaction would be found with the older children giving more strategy 
and self-evaluat.i.ve statements on the known type of task. The 
interaction of achievement level and type of task was also considered. 
Based on the literature findings, it was expected that an interaction 
would be found as evidenced by the higher achieving children giving more 
strategy and self-evaluative statements on the known type of task. 
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To test the relative use of general vs. specific strategies a 3 x 2 
x 2 x 2 (strategy) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
used. It was expected that the specific strategy statements would occur 
more with older children, higher achieving children and with known 
information. To test the relative use of ability vs. effort type of 
self-evaluation a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 (self-evaluative) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor was used. It was predicted that the lower 
achievers would use more self-evaluative ability statements for the 
unknown task, whereas, the higher achievers would use more 
self-evaluative effort statements on the unknown task. 
RESULTS 
A factorial analyses of variance design was used to examine 
children's responses on the metacognitive awareness questionnaire. 
There were three crossed factors. Grade Level ( four, six and eight) X 
Type of Task (known and unknown) X Achievement (high and low) 
Achievement was nested within Grade Level. Tables 1 and 2 present the 
means and standard deviations for the general and specific and for the 
ability and effort type of metacognitive statements, respectively. 
General strategy statements 
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The ANOVA for general strategy statements is shown in Table 3. A 
significant main effect for Grade,!_ (2,156) = 10.36, .E. <.001, revealed 
a difference in the number of general strategy statements selected 
according to grade level. An examination of the means as indicated in 
Table l showed a decreasing linear trend with children in grade four 
making a greater number of general strategy statements (~ = 5.38) than 
either sixth (!:!_ = 4.29) or eighth graders (~ = 3.89). Post hoc tests 
comparing the means were computed using the Tukey honestly significant 
difference (hsd) procedure. These analyses showed that differences 
between fourth and sixth (.£. <.OS) and fourth and eighth graders (.£. <.Ol) 
were significant, but the difference between sixth and eighth graders 
Problem 
Condition 
4th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
6th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
8th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for number of 
Metacognitive Strategy Statements 
N per cell= 14 
Metacognitive 
General 
Known Unknown 
5.21 5.35 
1.31 1.08 
5.71 5.21 
.61 1.36 
4.78 4.42 
2.08 2.02 
3.78 4.14 
2.04 2.24 
4.35 3.85 
1.44 2.10 
2.85 4.50 
2.31 1.87 
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Metacognitive 
Specific 
Known Unknown 
2.50 2 .42 
1.09 1.69 
3.50 3.78 
1.7l1 1.31 
2.35 3.28 
1.39 1.77 
1.71 3.00 
1.97 1.61 
1.92 2.35 
1.43 1.39 
2.00 2.57 
1.96 1.28 
Problem 
Condition 
4th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
6th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
8th Grade 
High Achievers 
M 
SD 
Low Achievers 
M 
SD 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for number of 
Self-evaluative Metacognitive Statements 
N per cell = 14 
Self-Evaluative 
Ability 
Known Unknown 
5.21 1.35 
1.05 1.33 
5.50 2.57 
• 7 5 1.65 
5.28 2.85 
1.43 1.83 
4.50 3.07 
1.74 1.43 
4.78 1.71 
1.57 1.43 
3.28 2.14 
1.93 1.61 
Self-Evaluative 
Effort 
Known Unknown 
4. v~ .57 
1.65 1.08 
4. 71 1.42 
1.85 1.65 
3.78 • 7 P; 
2.19 • 97 
2.07 1.57 
2.09 1.55 
2. 64 1.42 
1. 73 1.34 
• 92 1.07 
• 73 1.26 
Source of Variance 
Grade (A) 
Achievement (B:A) 
Task (C) 
A X C 
B:A X C 
Error 
*** .£. <.001. 
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for 
General Strategy Statements 
df MS 
2 33.01 
3 2. 93 
1 .72 
2 2.14 
3 6.43 
156 3.18 
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F 
10.368*** 
.922 
.226 
.675 
2.024 
was not significant. In contrast to predictions, younger children 
appeare<l more likely to endorse general strategy statements than older 
children. 
Specific strategy statements 
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The ANOVA for specific statements is shown in Table 4. A 
significant main effect for Grade level, F (2,156) = 3.96, _e_ <.OS, was 
found for specific strategy statements. The effect was a decreasing 
linear trend indicating that fourth graders chose more specific strategy 
statements(!= 3.05) than the sixth(~= 2.59) or eight graders(!= 
2.22). Tukey hsd post hoc tests, however, showed that only the 
difference between fourth and eighth graders was statistically 
significant (.E_ (.OS). 
A significant main effect of Achievement which is nested in Grade 
Level was found, K_ (3, 156) = 3.04, .E. <.OS. Post hoc comparisons made by 
using the Tukey hsd procedure resulted in significant differences 
between high and low achievers only at Grade 4 .!':_(3, 156) = 3. 95 £. < ■ Ol. 
The low achievers(!= 3.64) made a significantly greater number of 
specific strategy statements than the high achievers(!= 2.46). This 
finding was contrary to predictions. 
A significant main effect for Task, K_ (1.156) = 5.49, _e_ (.OS, 
showed that when given an unknown task, children gave more specific 
strategy statements than those given a known task. This finding did not 
Source of Variance 
Grade (A) 
Achievement (B:A) 
Task (C) 
AX C 
B:A X C 
Error 
*..e.<.os. 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for 
Specific Strategy Statements 
df MS 
2 9.89 
3 7.58 
1 13. 71 
2 3.55 
1 .31 
156 2,49 
28 
F 
3.967* 
3.044* 
5.!•96* 
1.424 
.127 
support the hypothesis that children would engage in more 
strategy-related thoughts when the task was more familiar. 
Ability statements 
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As shown on Table 5, the ANOVA for ability statements showed 
significant main effects for both Grade Level and Task. The main effect 
of Grade, F (2,156) = 5.78, E. <.Ol, showed that sixth graders chose more 
ability statements(!= 3.92) than either fourth(!= 3.66) or eighth 
graders (M = 2.98). Post hoc testing with the Tukey showed the 
difference in ability statements chosen between grades four and eight (.£. 
<.05) as well as between grades six and eight (.£. <.OS) was statistically 
significant. The main effect for Task,!_ (1,156) = 111.81, E. <.001, 
indicated that the known task elicited a significantly greater number of 
ability statements (M = 4. 76) than did the unknown task (! = 2. 28). This 
finding was expected and supported the hypothesis that the known task 
would elicit a greater number of self-evaluative statements. 
Both of these main effect findings were qualified by a Grade X Task 
interaction,!_ (2,156) = 3.87, E. <.05. An analysis of simple effects 
showed that the grade level effect was present whether the task was 
known,!_ (2,156) = 5.46, .E <.Ol, or unknown, E_ (2,156) = 4.02, .E <.os. 
Further testing using the Tukey procedure indicated that when the task 
was a known one only the fourth (! = 5 .35) and eighth graders (~ = 4 .03) 
differed significantly in the amount of ability statements given 
Table S 
Analysis of Variance for 
Ability Statements 
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------- - -----------------------
------- ----------------------
Source of Variance df MS F 
--------- ---------------------------------------------
Grade (A) 2 13.32 5.787 ** 
Achievement (B:A) 3 4.38 1.904 
Task (C) 1 257.52 111.816*** 
A X C 2 8.93 3.879 
* 
Il :A X C 3 6.50 2.827 * 
Error 156 2.30 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* £. (.OS. 
** £. (.01 • 
.£. (.001. 
(_p_ <. 05). When the task was unknown, it was the sixth graders (~ = 
2.96) who differed significantly from the fourth graders (~ = 1.96) (_e_ 
(.05) as well as the eighth graders(~= 1.92) (_p_ (,OS). Neither of 
these findings were consistent with the hypothesis that the older 
students given a known task would have the most self-evaluative 
statements, 
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An Achievement nested in Grade Level X Task interaction, !_ (3,156) 
= 2,82, .P.. <.OS, showed that the difference between the known and unknown 
task for high and low achievers differed at the three grade levels. 
Post hoc testing results using the Scheffe procedure were less than 
conclusive in describing the nature of the interaction. 
Effort statements 
The ANOVA for effort statements is shown in Table 6. A main effect 
for Grade on effort statements was significant,!_ (2,156) = 8,15, .P.. 
(.001, indicating a difference in the number of effort statements made 
according to grade level, Consistent with the previous findings but 
contrary to prediction, Tukey tests showed a decreasing linear trend 
with the fourth graders selecting a significantly greater number of 
effort statements than either the sixth graders(£ (,05) or the eighth 
graders (_p_ (.01). 
A significant main effect of Achievement which i.s nested in Grade 
Level was found, E'._ (3,156) = 3.40, .P.. <.OS. Post hoc comparisons made hy 
Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for 
Effort Statements 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of Variance 
Grade (A) 
Achievement 
Task 
A X C 
B:A X C 
Error 
* E_ <.OS. 
*** E_ <.001. 
(C) 
B:A 
df 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
156 
MS F 
20.11 8.150*** 
8.38 3.406 * 
152.38 61.744*** 
29.54 11. 970*** 
9.53 3.875 * 
2.46 
.I ,, 
,, 
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using the Tukey hsd procedure resulted in a finding of significant 
differences between high and low achievers only at Grade 8, !._ (3,156) = 
3.51, E_ (.05. The high achievers(!:!= 2.03) made a significantly 
greater number of effort statements than the low achievers (!:! = • 99). 
This finding was consistent with predictions that the high achieving 
older children would make the greatest number of self-evaluative 
statements. 
Task was also a significant predictor of children's use of effort 
statements,!_ (1,156) = 61.74, E. <.001. As expected, children given a 
known task made a greater number of effort statements (!:! = 3.05) than 
those given an unknown task (!:! = 1.15). The findings in both the 
ability and effort categories indicated children's willingness to give 
themselves credit for success when the task was a comfortable one and 
they had met with success. 
An interaction which qualified the previous main effects was a 
Grade X Task interaction,!_ (2,156) = 11.97, E. (.001. Simple effects 
testing showed that the grade level effect was present only when the 
task was a known one,!._ (2,156) = 19.93, E. (.01. Further testing with 
the Tukey, showed a statistically significant difference between all 
grades, the fourth and sixth (E_ (.01), the fourth and eighth (E_ (.01), 
and the sixth and eighth (E_ (.OS). 
Another interaction of significance was one of Achievement nested 
in Grade Level X Task,!_ (3,156) = 3.87, E_ (.OS. The difference in the 
number of effort statements for the known and unknown task differed for 
" 
;; 
;I, 
I 
I 
,' ,,, 
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high and low achievers. Post hoc testing results using the Scheffe 
procedure showed this was true only at the sixth grade level, E_ = 8.90, 
.E. <.OS. It was the sixth grade high achievers who differed significant-
ly in the number of effort statements made for the known (~ = 3. 78) and 
unknown task(!:!_= .78). 
Repeated measures 
To determine the effects of grade level, task, and achievement on 
the relative use of general vs. specific strategy statements, a 3 
(Grade) X 2 (Task) X 2 (Achievement) X 2 (Strategy) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the Strategy factor was used (See Table 7). This finding 
showed essentially no significant interaction effects involving the 
repeated factor, general versus specific strategy. 
To determine the effects of grade, task, and achievement on the 
relative use of ability vs. effort self-evaluative statements, a 3 
(Grade) x 2 (Task) X 2 (Achievement) X 2 (Self-evaluation) ANOVA ·with 
repeated measures on the Self-evaluation factor was used (See Table 8). 
A Grade X Self-evaluation interaction of significance was found,! 
(2,1S6) 3.S2, .E. <.OS. Simple effects tests showed that the grade 
level effect was present whether ability statements, I_ (2,156) = 7.74, .E. 
<.Ol, or effort statements were considered, E_ (2,1S6) = 11.68, .E. <.Ol. 
Further testing using the Tukey procedure indicateil that when ability 
statements were considered, the eighth graders made significantly fewer 
statements (M = 2.98) than either the fourth graders(~= 3.66) ~ <.OS), 
Table 7 
Between Subjects Analysis of Variance 
for Strategy Repeated Measure 
Source of Variance df MS 
Grade (A) 2 39.16 
Achievement (B:A) 3 7.35 
Task (C) 1 10.36 
A X C 2 3.14 
B:A X C 3 3.76 
Error 156 3.83 
Strategy (S) 1 302.86 
S X Grade (A) 2 3.75 
s X Achievement (S X B:A) 3 3.16 
S X Task (C) 1 4.07 
S X A X C 2 2.55 
S X (B:A) X C 3 2. 98 
Error 156 1.84 
*** .E. <.001. 
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F 
10.21 *** 
1.92 
2.70 
.82 
.98 
164. 35 1o~* 
2.04 
1.72 
2.21 
1.39 
1.62 
Table 8 
Between Subjects Analysis of Variance 
for Self-evaluative Repeated Measure 
Sour.ce of Variance 
Grade (A) 
Achievement (B:A) 
Task (C) 
A X C 
B:A X C 
Error 
Self-evaluative 
E X Grade (A) 
EX Achievement 
EX Task (C) 
E X A X C 
EX (B:A) 
Error 
* p <.OS. 
** p (.01. 
*** p <.001. 
X C 
(E) 
(E X B:A) 
df MS 
2 27 .37 
3 12 .07 
1 403.04 
2 33 .14 
3 14. 29 
156 3.04 
1 172 .42 
2 6.06 
3 .65 
1 6.85 
2 5.33 
3 1.74 
156 1.72 
36 
F 
8.98 *** 
3. 97 ** 
132.21 *** 
10.87 *** 
4.70 ** 
99.52 
*** 3.52 
* 
.38 
3.98 
* 3.09 * 
1.01 
or the sixth graders (!!_ = 3.92) (.E. <.Ol). There were no significant 
difference in the number of ability statements made between the fourth 
(M = 3.66) and sixth graders(!'!= 3.92). 
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Another signifi.cant interaction found was that of Task X 
Self-evaluation,! (1,156) = 3.98, .E. (.05. Simple effects tests, 
however, showed that ability statements were more frequent that effort 
statements under both conditions of the known task! (1,156) = 35.83, E. 
(.01, or the unknown task,! (1,156) = 15.92, .E. <.Ol. The tendency to 
choose positive ability statements was quite high when the task was a 
known one (.!:'!. = 4. 7 6). At the same time when the task was unknown, there 
was a tendency not to choose negative effort statements(.!:'!.= 1.14). 
A Grade X Task X Self-evaluation interaction of significance was 
also found, ! (2,156) = 3.09, .E. (.05. Post hoc comparisons made us.ing 
the Scheffe procedure were less than conclusive in showing the nature of 
this interaction. 
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DISCUSSION 
The present study addressed several important questions. The first 
concerned differences between metacognitive awareness at various grade 
levels, The results indicated that younger children differ from older 
children in their metacognitive awareness, A second question addressed 
differences between high and low achieving students' metacognitive 
awareness, Differences in achievement level were found at different 
grade levels and when achievement level was comblned with task there was 
a tendency for high and low achievers to differ in their metacognitions. 
A third question addressed differences in metacognltive awareness 
between two types of task. Specific strategy statements occurred more 
frequently with an unknown tsk, and abiLity and effort self-evaluative 
statements occurred more often with a known task, 
Type of task 
The present study lends support to prior research findings 
(Covington, 1979) which show that students are much more willing to 
identify positive ability and positive effort statements than negative 
ones, It also lends strong support to the research that indicates 
children wish to appear effortful and capable (Covington & Omelich, 
1979). Children, in this study, given a known or easy task engaged in 
positive self-evaluation, They responded to success with statments such 
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as "I am good in math," "I knew what I was doing," "I am good at this 
kind of work," "I tried my best," and "I try hard on things like this." 
Children in this study given an unknown or difficult task did not 
openly evaluate their ability or effort. They did not choose statements 
such as "I am not good in math," or "I didn't work hard enough." 
Children given the hard or unknown task responded to specific strategy 
statements such as "I figured out little parts of the problem, then I 
did the work," and "I thought about how the problems were like ones I 
did before." They thought about specific things they could do to help 
solve the problem. 
It had been expected that the known task would elicit more specific 
strategy statements. The literature on memory suggests that material 
must be familiar before one can focus on the strategies needed to learn 
or memorize it. Chi (1981) found that when children who knew the game 
of chess were shown a chess board that was set up in a game pattern, 
they were able to memorize the placement of the chess pieces much faster 
than adults who had no background in chess. Other literature suggests 
that prior knowledge plays an important part in learning new material. 
A story or lesson is much easier to understand or learn when information 
about the subject matter is familiar to the learner. It was therefore 
expected that if the task was known or familiar, the children could use 
strategies to help them solve the problem. In this study, however, the 
children indicated they were aware of using specific strategies when the 
problems were difficult. A reason for this may have been that the 
difficult math problems were hard, but their form was familiar. The 
problems consisted of vocabulary and mathematical procedures which the 
children often used. The difficulty of the problems varied, hut the 
nature and requirement of both the known and unknown task were similar. 
Although the children could not correctly solve the difficult problems, 
their knowledge of basic math computation and their ability to 
understand what the problem was asking may have given them prior 
knowledge or familiarity. This familiar.Hy allowed them to think about 
appropriate strategies for solving the problem. This would indicate 
that strategies can be used in solving d.ifficult problems when there is 
background knowledge or familiarity with the subject already present. 
A recent study by Rohrkemper and Bershon (1984), has shown that 
when children were asked to talk to themselves when doing difficult math 
problems, their self-speech involved cognitive strategies dealing 
especially with problem solving. The results of the present study and 
the Rohrkemper and Bershon findings suggest that at least in the area of 
math, with a known vocabulary and known mathematical procedures, 
individuals are aware of using specific strategies in helping them solve 
difficult problems. These findings also indicated that when the math 
problems were relatively easy, the students were less aware of using 
cognitive strategies. When performance became automatic, their 
awareness was directed to the ability or effort they had put forth 
rather than to strategies. 
From an attributional perspective, a known task that brings success 
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elicits an awareness of causal factors of both ability and effort 
(Weiner, 1979). Additionally, from a learning perspective, an unknown 
or difficult task elicits specific strategy awareness, an awareness of 
rnethods or specific ways that may help in solving the problem 
(Rohrkemper & Bershon, 1984). Therefore, if a task is easy, one thinks 
about the ahili ty or effort which has been responsible for success. If 
a task is more difficult, one must concentrate on the cognitive 
strategies needed to solve the problem. A known or easy task does not 
elicit an awareness of the strategies used to solv~ the problem because 
it is not necessary. Solving an easy problem is almost automatic, it 
just happens. 
It is not clear how difficult a problem must be before children 
begin to consider making strategies explicit. Are children aware of 
using strategies whenever a problem presents some challenge or do they 
only think of them when a problem is so difficult as to be unsolvable? 
If strategy use is an important skill to be learned, and if it is to be 
taught to children, we must consider how to teach it. Teaching the use 
of strategies with simple problems may not be effective. In summary, 
the role of problem difficulty in the teaching and learning of cognitive 
strategies needs further consideration. 
Grade level 
Another purpose of the present study was to investigate the effects 
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of grade level differences on metacognitive awareness. Contrary to 
expectations, it was found that the younger children made a greater 
number of metacognitive awareness statements than the oldest children. 
This may have been because the known task was not an automatic one for 
the fourth graders. They needed strategies to help them solve the 
unknown task. They may also have found the known task more difficult 
than the older children and thus may have needed strategies to help them 
solve the known problems as well. 
Another explanation for these findings was that the younger 
children responded to the familiarity of the metacognitive statements. 
They have heard admonitions such as "Pay attention", "Read it 
carefully", "Try your hardest", and "You can do it", in the classroom 
and probably during tasks similar to the ones in this study. It is 
possible that the younger children were aware of the metacognitive 
thoughts one should have and responded with what they believed they 
should be thinking. In other words, they responded to statements 
connected to classwork that they have often heard, rather than to their 
actual thoughts while dong the task. 
This viewpoint is substantiated by Bjorklund and Zeman ( 1982). 
They found that first, third, and fifth graders were able to perform the 
memory task of naming everyone in their class ■ While the children were 
naming their classmates, they were scored on how their answers clustered 
together, whether they were naming children according to sex, seating 
arrangements, etc. After recall, strategies of recall were explained to 
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the students and they were asked which of these or other strategies they 
had used. About half of the first grade, and almost all of the third 
and fifth graders claimed to use strategies, but additional analysis 
showed that fifty percent or more of the children at each grade level 
named strategies that they had not in fact employed. Knowledge or 
awareness of strategies was present, but the use of these verbalized 
strategies was not yet consistently applied. Miller and Weiss (1982) 
also reported similar findings with second and fifth graders. Students 
at both grade levels were able to name variables that affect a learning 
task, but when given a learning task, they were not able to apply this 
knowledge to their own learning. 
Following this line of reasoning, the results of the present study 
may be indicative of younger children's awareness of metacognition in 
general. But when a specific task is considered, we cannot conclude 
that the fourth graders (and perhaps even the sixth graders) actually 
used or thought about all the strategies they mentioned on their 
questionnaires. A questionnaire that includes strategies that children 
hear in a classroom as well as strategy-type statements that are less 
likely to be mentioned might help clarify the issue as to whether or not 
the younger children are reacting to familiarity of these phrases rather 
than actual thoughts about strategies. Studies on children's awareness 
of the strategies they actually employ on a task could include 
instruments other than or in addition to a questionnaire. A 
questionnaire followed by an actual learning situation in which the 
questionnaire strategies could be monitored might also be a way to 
distinguish between knowledge of strategies and actual strategy use. 
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From a learning perspective, implications are that educators cannot 
assume that a knowledge of cognitive strategies means a usage of these 
same strategies, It also implies that when young children are asked how 
they studied or learned something their answer may show an awareness of 
what strategies they should use, but this may not be indicative of 
actual strategy use. 
The effect of a known or unknown task influenced all grade levels. 
As indicated in the literature, children feel more comfortable crediting 
their ability or effort when the task is easy and they meet with 
success, This was found to be true especially with the younger children 
who gave the greatest number of positive ability and effort statements. 
All children in the study seemed equally unwilling to cite a lack of 
effort following failure on the unknown task, This may have been 
because the situation was an experimental one and children usually do 
try hard in a situation such as this, Therefore, lack of effort cannot 
become a possible reason for failure, The sixth graders, however, 
responded to failure with the greatest number of statements indicating a 
lack of ability. The reason for this finding is unclear, but may in 
part be due to the educational atmosphere, These children have spent 
several years in a classroom situation where comparison with others is 
inevitable, and it may be that at this point in time they are feeling 
vulnerable. The findings may also be explained by Nicholls' research on 
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casual attribution. Nicholls (1978) described four levels of reasoning 
about ability and effort. The levels were found to be age related. At 
level 1, effort and ability are used interchangeably and at level 2, 
effort is perceived as the causal factor for most outcomes. By level 3, 
children begin to use ability more often as a cause of outcomes and they 
begin to see the interaction of ability and effort that is found in 
Level L1. Sixth graders, who are often between levels 2 and 4, begin to 
see that if effort was used and failure still occurred then lack of 
ability must be the cause. Further investigation is necessary to see 
if Nicholls' finding is a consistent one at this age or if external 
variables may have been responsible for the outcome of this study. 
Self-evaluative statements 
Another interesting finding was the interaction of self-evaluative 
statements and the type of task. Children were much more willing to 
take credit for success than they were to give a personal reason for 
their failure. This might have been a function of the statements used 
on the questionnaire. The statements that would have been checked for 
failure on the unknown task may have been too negative, Although the 
children did not succeed, they did not seem willing to say such things 
as "The harder the problems got, the less I tried," or "I usually don't 
try hard on things like this," A Likert-type questionnaire which al-
lows for gradations of feelings m.ight lessen this effect• It also must 
be remembered that these children were tested in a school and these 
statements are not ones that are usually expressed in a school or 
classroom situation. 
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lt was expected that the findings on the achivement variable would 
replicate the attributional literature on learned helpless and mastery 
oriented children. Low achievers were expected to make a smaller number 
of self-evaluative statements when they succeeded and a greater number 
of self-evaluative statements when they failed. This, however, was not 
the case. The only significant difference was found between the eighth 
grade high and low achievers. The eighth grade high achievers made a 
greater number of effort statements than the low achievers. The find-
ings may not have been as predicted partly :lue to the population of this 
study. The students were labeled as high and low achievers based on 
whether thei.r math achievement scores were above or below the median for 
their grade level. As a result, some children labeled low achievers were 
actually performing at grade level or above, These children were low 
achievers in their grades, but would not parallel low achievers in the 
general population and thus may not have responded as a child having 
difficulty with schoolwork. 
When achievement was combined with task, the results became more 
predictable. Both high and low achievers were more willing to be 
self-enhancing when the task was easy and were much less willing to be 
negative about their ability and effort when the task was difficult, 
However, even when the task was easy, there was a tendency for the low 
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achievers to be less confident than the high achievers of their ability 
and effort. The tendency was for children who usually did well in math 
to be the most self-enhancing. When the task was unknown or difficult, 
there was a tendency for the low achievers to make a greater number of 
negative statements about their ability choosing such remarks as "I am 
not good in math," and "I can't do this kind of work." This tendency was 
also present when effort statements were examined; however, the findings 
did not reach a level or significance for either the ability or effort 
statements. 
It was the fourth grade low achievers who made the largest number 
of negative effort statement. This could partly be explained by 
Nicholls' levels of reasoning about ability and effort. Nicholls (1978) 
found that third graders are often at a level 2. At this level, effort 
is seen as the main cause of an outcome. Whether the outcome is success 
or failure, it is seen as due to effort or a lack of it. Nothing else 
is considered. The older children could see their failure in some cases 
as due to a lack of effort but they could also see their failure as due 
to other causes at other times. However, the fourth graders at a level 
2 stage of reason.ing had only a lack of effort to blame for their 
failure. The largest number of negative effort statements made by the 
fourth grade low achievers could also have been due to their willingness 
to make socially acceptable responses. They have often heard comments 
concerning effort in the classroom such as "Did you really try on 
this?", and •~erhaps you need to try harder." The fourth graders, 
-
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wanting to please and feeling that effort is responsible for outcomes, 
chose a larger number of negative effort statements than the older 
children. The lack of negative ability statements can also be explained 
by a self-worth theory of achievement behavior (Kun & Weiner, 1973). 
Individuals try to maintain a positive self-image of ability 
particularly when risking failure. A self-concept of high ability must 
be maintained whenever possible, Thus it is better to blame a lack of 
effort rather than a lack of ability for failure. The children also 
knew that on the unknown task everyone did poorly thus they did not have 
reason to feel that they were not as smart as the other fourth graders. 
From both an attributional and learning perspective, it would seem 
that as children progress through school, they become more aware of 
their ability or lack of it. Many low achievers seem to have given up 
and decided they have no control over their failure. It happend because 
they lack ability and nothing they can do can change things, The 
youngest children have not yet reached this conclusion. The high 
achieving fourth graders credited their ability for their success, and 
the low achievers felt that lack of effort was the reason for their 
failure. More effort on their part and they too could succeed. It is 
this attitude which needs to be fostered so that later learning is not 
undermined by an attitude of helplessness, It is also important to 
further investigate the relationship between metacognitive awareness and 
the use of metacognitive strategies. Children are aware of 
metacognition, but it is not known how much of this awareness is 
·•-·------·· -.·· ---------------------------------------
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actually implemente<l in learning situations. There is a need to clarify 
this relatlonship so that educators can beco;ne more effective teachers 
and children can become more effective learners. 
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CONCLUSION 
Metacognition has recently been singled out as a very important 
factor in learning. An awareness of cognitive strategies as well as an 
awareness of oneself as a learner is necessary to be a successful 
learner. Although there has been a lot written on the subject, most of 
the writing has been of a descriptive and theoretical nature. There is 
a significant lack of research in this area especially in the area of 
classroom performance. 
In the current study, the di.fficulty of the task children were 
given had a greater influence on metacognitive process than other 
factors. In both metacogni tive and attributional studies, students have 
actively considered specific ways in which they could respond to 
difficult problems. Easy tasks have engendered self-enhancing comments 
about both ability and effort. These findings were replicated in the 
present study. Younger children responded with the greatest number of 
metacognitive awareness statements for both learning strategies and 
self-evaluative statements; however, there are serious concerns that 
this awareness may not necessarily be put to use, It seems that social 
desirability may have been a factor in this finding, 
High achievers felt good about their effort when they were 
successful; however, the low achievers tended to feel defeated when they 
51 
failed. The older children felt successful if they were high achievers, 
but the low achievers appeared helpless to change their failure. These 
conclusions have important i1nplications for educators. It is one of the 
goals of education to have students who take responsibility for their 
learning. More investigation is needed into how we can help low 
achievers to feel more in control of their learnlng. 
There is also much being done to teach children cognitive 
strategies in the schools. A re-evaluation of what we are teaching is 
necessary. The literature as well as the findings of this study suggest 
that children are aware of metacogni tive strategies. The fourth graders 
reported using the greatest number of strategies. This could have been 
because the task was relatively more difficult for them. There is, 
however, research that suggests young children know which strategies to 
use but cannot apply the knowledge. Further investigation of this 
question by task monitoring would help to ascertain whether or not 
strategy knowledge and use occur together in young children. 
Finally there is a need to examine how learning strategies or study 
skills are being taught. Strategies may be thought about but not 
necessarily used by young children. If the strategies are used, this 
study found the use is with difficult material. The usual curriculum is 
to teach study or learning skills with familiar material. Perhaps there 
is a need to re-evaluate the manner in which we teach metacognitive 
strategies and motivate children to ;1ctually use them. 
Future research might focus on studies that would evaluate 
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students' knowledge of metacognition and then test for use of that 
knowledge in a specific situation. Another area of future research 
might consider the self-evaluations of the low achiever. It is 
important to find out at what point in their schooling children begin to 
see their achievement as out of their control. It is also important to 
see if this happens to all low achieving students at about the same 
grade leve 1. By identifying this period and the children affected, we 
could then try to help the low achiever stay in control of his 
learning. 
- --~----
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Appendix A 
Test Given to Those in the "Known" Category 
John had 10 goldfish. His mother gave him 3 more and Aunt Mary gave him 
5 more. How many goldfish did John have in all? 
If a girl had 24 stickers and she gave away 4, how many did she have 
left? 
In the 6th grade, there are 15 girls and 12 boys. How many children are 
there altogether? 
There were 20 problems on a math test. Sue did 5 problems wrong. How 
many problems did she get right? 
Appendix B 
Test Given to Those in the "Unknown" category 
Rulers cost 20 cents more than pencils. If 15 pencils cost as much as 
10 rulers, how much does one n1ler cost? 
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Peggy had 4 tests. Her average mark was 7'i3. What mark does Peggy need 
to get on the next test to bring her average mark up to 82? 
A boy was paid $50 for 5 days of work. He worked 4 hours each day. How 
muci1 a minute di<l he earn? 
Bill has 25 coins. He wants to sell 4. How many different sets of 4 
coins could he choose from the 25? 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire For Those Given the ''Known" Test 
YES NO Were you thinking about anything as you did the problems? 
1. I kept my mind on my work. 
2. I knew what I was doing. 
3. I concentrated on these problems. 
4. I paid attention to what I was doing. 
S. I worked hard on this. 
6. I asked myself questions like "Did I add the right numbers?" 
7. I try hard on things like this. 
8. I am a hard worker. 
9. I am good at this kind of work. 
10. I pictured the numbers in my head and then did the work in my 
head. 
11. I can do this work. 
12. I first thought about what the answer should be, then I did the 
problem. 
13. This was easy for me. 
14. I read the problems carefully. 
15. I thought about what I was doing. 
16. I am good in math. 
17. The harder the problems got, the harder I tried, 
18. I thought I was doing well, 
19. I tried my best to get these right. 
20. I thought about the problem by using a blackboard in my head, 
21. I tried my best. 
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Appendix C (Continued) 
- 22. I figured out little parts of the problem, then I did the work. 
......____ 2 3 . I thought about how the problems were like ones I d.id before. 
_24. I thought about the problems. 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire For Those Given the 'Unknown" TeS t 
_YES No anyth1
·ng as you did the problems? 
Were you thinking about 
--
-
--
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
I kept my mind on my work. 
I didn't know what I was doing. 
I concentrated on these problems. 
I paid attention to what I was doing. 
I didn't work hard enough. 
I asked myself questions like "Did I add the right numbers?" 
I usually don't try hard on things like this. 
I didn't work hard enough. 
I am not good at this kind of work. 
lO • I pictured the numbers in TJ1Y head and then did the work in my 
head. 
11. I can't do this work. 
12. I first thought about what the answer should be, then I did the 
problem. 
13. This was hard for me. 
14. I read the problems carefully. 
15 • I thought about what I was doing. 
16. I am not good in math. 
17 • The harder the problems got, the less I trierl. 
18. I didn't think I was doing well. 
19. I didn't try hard enough to get these right. 
20. I thought about the problem by using a blackboard in my head. 
21. I didn't try to do well. 
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Appendix D (Continued) 
-
22. I figured out little parts of the problem, then I did the work. 
-
23. I thought about how the problems were like ones I did before. 
- 2li. I thought about the problems. 
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